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FEDERAL COURT INTERVENTION
IN JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS
By JOE A. CANNON*
N the wake of the increased attention focused on juvenile
courts by In re Gault,' resort to federal injunctive and
declaratory relief as a means of testing the constitutionality of
juvenile statutes and processes has become increasingly com-
mon.2 It is the purpose of this article to examine the viability
of this course of action.
I. TACTICAL ADVANTAGES
There are a number of compelling reasons for electing a
federal over a state forum in cases involving the validity of
juvenile statutes and processes. An initial consideration is the
inadequacy of relief available in state courts. Overloaded state
appellate dockets produce inordinate delay; and, since few
courts are willing to grant stays of execution or bail pending
appeal in juvenile proceedings, such delay inevitably reduces
the value of a favorable decision for the juvenile.
A second reason for seeking federal intervention is that a
favorable decision by a state appellate court does not have the
direct, broad effect on the field of law that is characteristic of
* Associate Director of the National Juvenile Law Center, St. Louis Uni-
versity; B.A., Oklahoma State University, 1961; J.D., Tulsa University
School of Law, 1966.
1 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Gault is the first Supreme Court case to consider
the major questions of fundamental fairness and procedural due process
and resolve them in favor of the juvenile.
2 Mailliard v. Gonzales, 39 U.S.L.W. 3500 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1971), appeal
filed, (U.S. April 9, 1971) (No. 1565). This case challenges the con-
stitutionality of a statute bringing within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court any person under age 21 "who from any cause is in danger of
leading an idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral life." The state is appeal-
ing an adverse decision of a three-judge court. At the time of this
writing, no decision has been made on probable jurisdiction. Compare
Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971) (decided on the vague-
ness issue).
In Phillips v. Cole, 298 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Miss. 1968) the plaintiff
sought to enjoin the trial of juveniles for delinquency under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970) unless they were properly advised of their right to counsel
and counsel was appointed in appropriate cases. The court found fed-
eral intervention appropriate and enjoined court proceedings after con-
sideration, and rejection, of the limits of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). Using
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) as its base, the court required proper
advisements of the right to counsel in the Mississippi Youth Court.
In Conover v. Montemuro, 304 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. Pa. 1969) the
failure of a juvenile court to provide constitutional standards at intake
was attacked. The court found that the complaint stated a substantial
federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(1970) and denied a motion to dismiss.
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federal declaratory or injunctive relief.8 Thus, although a deci-
sion by a state appellate court may set out requirements for its
juvenile courts or release a child from wrongful detention, the
actual malpractice in the reversed court may continue, requiring
correction on a case by case basis.
A third consideration is that direct appeal within the state
system wastes the legal resources of various defense and legal
services agencies by requiring repetitious representation. In
contrast, one successful declaratory judgment or class action
injunction consolidates the work of many lawyers representing
individual children in direct appeals.
Finally, resort to federal relief provides direct access to the
federal appellate courts.4 Here, one is more likely to find a
sympathetic and attentive forum when challenging governmen-
tal practices which abuse the constitutional rights of children.
In summary, for those concerned with the reform of juve-
nile law, federal injunctive and declaratory relief is desirable
because it offers a speedy, adequate remedy and provides a
direct avenue to the federal appellate courts. Whether such
relief is available under the present law of federal intervention
is considered below.
11. THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURT INTERVENTION IN STATE
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS - Younger v. Harris
The most recent expression by the Supreme Court on the
law of federal court intervention in state criminal proceedings
is Younger v. Harris.5 This case, together with its companion
cases,6 seems to foreclose the possibility of federal intervention
in juvenile proceedings. However, a close comparison of the
facts of these cases with the nature of juvenile proceedings re-
veals the inapplicability of the reasoning of the Younger series
to juvenile cases.
3 A prime example has been the continuing problem of In re Gault. See
Glen, Juvenile Court Reform: Procedural Process and Substantive
Stasis, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 431.
4 If a federal complaint is filed seeking to enjoin the operation of a state
statute on grounds of conflict with the Federal Constitution, it may be
necessary to convene a three-judge court. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970).
Appeals from decisions of three-judge panels are made directly to
the U.S. Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970). If a three-judge
court is not required to hear the action, appeal proceeds to the court of
appeals for that federal circuit. On the question of when a three-judge
panel must be convened see generally Currie, The Three-Judge District
Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHi. L. REv. 1 (1964).
5401 U.S. 37 (1971).
6 Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77
(1971); Bryne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401
U.S. 200 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
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A. Injunctive Relief Under Younger
Decided February 23, 1971, Younger involved a challenge
to the California Criminal Syndicalism Act7 on grounds of
vagueness and overbreadth. Plaintiff, Harris, while being prose-
cuted for a violation of the Act, brought a complaint in federal
court praying for injunctive relief. He alleged that the Cali-
fornia statute was unconstitutional and, therefore, further prose-
cution under it should be enjoined. Several plaintiff-intervenors
entered the case claiming that possible prosecution under the
statute inhibited their constitutional rights to engage in political
activity and to teach.
Pursuant to the federal anti-injunction statutes, a three-
judge district court was convened to consider the constitution-
ality of the Act.8 The court concluded that the Act was uncon-
stitutionally vague and overbroad and enjoined the defendant-
prosecutor from further prosecutions under it.9 Utilizing the
direct appeal statute, 10 the defendant proceeded to the Supreme
Court. After considering issues of comity" and abstention 12 not
raised by the appellant, the Court ruled that:
[T]he judgment of the District Court, enjoining appellant,
Younger, from prosecuting under these California statutes, must
be reversed as a violation of the national policy forbidding fed-
eral courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings
except under special circumstances.
13
The plaintiff-appellees who had not actually been charged with
violations of the California Act were denied standing to chal-
lenge it, the Court considering it a small likelihood that they
7 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 11400, 11402 (West 1970). See Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357 (1927), dealing with the same statute and overruled by
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
8 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-84 (1970), provides for the convening of a three-judge
district court in cases challenging the constitutionality of a state statute.
For a general discussion of the pre-Younger requirements for convening
a three-judge court see D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS CASES AND MATERIALS
530 (1968); Durfee & Sloss, Federal Injunction Against Proceedings in
State Courts: The Life History of a Statute, 30 MicH. L. REV. 1145
(1932); Comment, Federal Injunctions Against Proceedings in State
Courts, 35 CAL. L. REV. 545 (1947); Comment, Anti-Suit Injunctions
Between State and Federal Courts, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (1965).
9 Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
1028 U.S.C. § 1253 (1966).
11 The doctrine of comity is a policy of non-interference based on the con-
cept that "federal courts, in exercising their jurisdiction, should give
consideration to the sovereign status of the individual state." Maraist,
Federal Injuctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Sig-
nificance of Dombrowski, 48 TEx. L. REV. 535, 541 (1970).
12 The doctrine of abstention is a doctrine of judicial self-restraint. Under
it, a federal court whose jurisdiction has been properly invoked, may
postpone its decision pending disposition in the state court. See Note,
Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in an
Activist Era, 80 HAnv. L. REV. 604, 607 (1967).
13 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 41 (1971).
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would ever be prosecuted under the statute.14 Harris, however,
was found to have sufficient standing by virtue of his prosecu-
tion, and the Court discussed the issues on the bases of his case.
Justice Black in delivering the opinion of the Court stated
that the underlying reason for limited intervention in state
prosecutions was the prevention of unnecessary conflict between
state and federal governments in accordance with the concept
of federalism.'5 Only in those cases where irreparable injury
would result should the federal courts take jurisdiction to enjoin
pending state criminal prosecutions. The irreparable injury
14 The Court summarized:
But here appellees Dan, Hirsch, and Broslawsky do not claim
that they have ever been threatened with prosecution, that a
prosecution is likely, or even that a prosecution is remotely
possible. They claim the right to bring this suit solely because,
in the language of their complaint, they "feel inhibited." We do
not think this allegation even if true, is sufficient to bring the
equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts into play to enjoin
a pending state prosecution. A federal lawsuit to stop a prose-
cution in a state court is a serious matter. And persons having
no fears of state prosecution except those that are imaginary or
speculative, are not to be excepted as appropriate plaintiffs
in such cases.
Id. at 42.
15 While the historical precedent for such reasoning is clear enough, it
is the author's belief that the conflict is three-sided. The people as a
third entity must be considered in terms of present day effect and in the
historical perspective. The widespread use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)
as a device to provide a federal forum for state-people conflicts cannot
be overlooked when considering modern practice. Historically, the
thrust of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments was the
protection of the people against the acts of the states rather than the
federal government. To limit the role of the federal courts in such dis-
putes may result in more conflict than might result in federal-state
relations by allowing broader intervention. Justice Douglas in his
dissent to Younger adopted the view that the constitutional perspective
was changed by the events of the Civil War and thereafter:
There is no more good reason for allowing a general statute
dealing with federalism passed at the end of the 18th century
to control another statute also dealing with federalism, passed
almost 80 years later, than to conclude that the early concepts
of federalism were not changed by the Civil War.
401 U.S. at 62.
That was the view of Judge Will in Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp.
200, 223 (N.D. Ill. 1968):
This revolution, in turn, represents a historical judgment. It
emphasizes the overwhelming concern of the Reconstruction
Congresses for the protection of the newly won rights of freed-
men. By interposing the federal government between the states
and their inhabitants, these Congresses sought to avoid the risk
of nullification of these rights by the states. With the subse-
quent passage of the Act of 1871, Congress sought to implement
this plan by expanding the federal judicial power. Section
1983 is, therefore, not only an expression of the importance of
protecting federal rights from infringement by the states but
also, where necessary, the Congressional desire to place the
national government between the state and its citizens.
See, Note, The Dombrowski Remedy -Federal Injunctions Against
State Court Proceedings Violative of Constitutional Rights, 21 RUTGERS
L. REV. 92 (1966), which supports Justice Douglas' view that 42 U.S.C.




threatened must be "both great and immediate" and beyond the
injury one might risk by the mere fact of being prosecuted in
the state court. The Court concluded that:
Certain types of injury, in particular, the cost, anxiety, and in-
convenience of having to defend against a single criminal prose-
cution, could not by themselves be considered "irreparable" in
the special legal sense of that term. Instead, the threat to the
plaintiff's federally protected rights must be one that cannot
be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prose-
cution. 16
In an attempt to clarify this standard, the Court indicated
that the threat of multiple prosecutions might present the in-
jury required by Younger if the prosecution is coupled with bad
faith. However, whether a single or multiple prosecution is
threatened, the additional factor of bad faith was seen as a
requirement in most cases.1
7
The court went on to conclude that it is the quality of bad
faith which distinguishes Younger from Dombrowski v. Pfister,18
an earlier Supreme Court case relied upon by the lower court
in granting the original injunction. The element of bad faith in
Dombrowski was the intent of the Louisiana prosecutor to pre-
vent the plaintiffs from exercising their constitutional rights by
instituting prosecutions without legitimate hope of securing
convictions. Although Justice Black believed Dombrowski was
correct in this narrow sense, he noted that the case had sub-
sequently been too broadly construed on the issue of whether
the unconstitutionality of a state statute on its face is sufficient
to meet federal equitable requirements of irreparable injury.
According to Justice Black:
It is undoubtedly true, as the Court stated in Dombrowski, that
"[a] criminal prosecution under a statute regulating expression
usually involves imponderables and contingencies that them-
selves may inhibit the full exercise of First Amendment free-
doms." But this sort of "chilling effect," as the Court called it,
should not by itself justify federal intervention. 19
It appears that with respect to injunctive relief, Younger
stands for the proposition that federal courts may not intervene
in state criminal proceedings without a clear showing of ir-
reparable injury. While what constitutes irreparable injury is
16 401 U.S. at 46 (footnotes omitted).
17 At the end of his opinion in Younger, Justice Black did indicate that
"[t]here may be ... extraordinary circumstances in which the necessary
irreparable injury can be shown even in the absence of the usual pre-
requisites of bad faith and harassment." 401 U.S. at 53. See also Perez
v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 93 (1971) (Justice Brennan's dissent).
Is 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
19 401 U.S. at 50.
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not precisely defined, bad faith prosecution under a challenged
law clearly falls within the standard.
B. Declaratory Relief Under Younger
A request for declaratory relief commonly accompanies a
prayer for injunctive relief.2 0 Consequently, a collateral ques-
tion is raised concerning the applicability of the standards an-
nounced in Younger to cases brought under the Declaratory
Judgment statute.21 Consideration of this issue is necessary
when seeking to avoid the possible restrictive application of
Younger.
In Samuels v. Mackell,22 a companion case to Younger, it
was reasoned that the practical effect of a declaratory judg-
ment is the same as an injunction, since under a declaratory
judgment statute a court can effectuate and protect its own
orders (the declaratory judgment) by means of an injunction.
In this circuitous manner, federal courts may intervene in state
court prosecutions. This being so, to apply different standards
to declaratory judgment actions and injunction cases would
operate to frustrate the questionable policy of noninterference
with state criminal prosecutions.23 Nevertheless, the language
of Samuels suggests that declaratory judgment actions may
enjoy a greater flexibility than injunctive cases. The Court
carefully pointed out that:
We do not mean to suggest that a declaratory judgment
should never be issued in cases of this type if it has been con-
cluded that injunctive relief would be improper. There may be
improper. There may be unusual circumstances in which an
injunction might be withheld because, despite a plaintiff's strong
claim for relief under the established standards, the injunctive
remedy seemed particularly intrusive or offensive; in such a
situation, a declaratory judgment might be appropriate and
might not be contrary to the basic equitable doctrines govern-
ing the availability of relief.
24
20 Such a claim was not joined in Younger, although the Court indicated
that a prayer asking "such other and further relief as to the Court may
seem just and proper," might include a declaratory judgment. 401 U.S.
at 42 n.2.
21 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1970).
22401 U.S. 66 (1971). The plaintiffs had been indicted for violations of
the New York Anarchy statute prior to filing their suit.
23 The Younger court ruled that the injunctive relief sought actually
existed as a remedy not by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 2283, but as a judicially
fashioned exception to that statute. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908). Also, the Court dismissed the argument that, because declara-
tory judgment relief is founded upon a statute unlike the injunctive
remedy, the traditional requirements for irreparable injury and stand-
ing are not applicable. It reiterated that the actions were quite similar
in nature and effect, and that the legislative history of the declaratory
judgment statute indicated "traditional equitable principles" were in-
tended to apply.
24 401 U.S. at 73.
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Obviously, this is a restrictively worded exception; never-
theless, it indicates that where an injunction is not an appropri-
ate remedy, declaratory relief will not necessarily be barred as a
device for entry into a federal court. What would constitute
the requisite "unusual circumstances" to justify declaratory re-
lief is left for future consideration by the courts.
Even if the same stringent standards apply to the propriety
of declaratory relief where state prosecution is pending, it may
be possible to draw a distinction between pending and threat-
ened proceedings and argue that in the latter situation an alle-
gation of an overbroad or vague law25 is sufficient to warrant
declaratory relief. Such was the tack taken by Justice Brennan
dissenting in Perez v. Ledesma.26 He argued that, if the state
prosecution has been filed prior to the federal action, the state
"provides an adequate forum for the adjudication of constitu-
tional rights, [and] the federal courts should not ordinarily
intervene. '27 If, however, the state criminal prosecution has not
been filed, or has been terminated by nolle prosequi, then no
forum exists in which the plaintiff may assert his constitutional
objections. Under such facts, the compelling reasons for non-
intervention have not arisen.
Arguably, then, the federal forum may be sought where
no active state prosecution is in progress at the time of the
federal hearing, because the basis for nonintervention, i.e.,
interference with the state criminal process and the supposed
resultant federal-state friction, no longer exists. In such cases
declaratory relief would be a proper remedy since it is unneces-
sary to risk prosecution under a criminal statute to avail one-
self of the protection of the Declaratory Judgment Act. These
were issues not considered by the majority in Perez.
III. JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS AND FEDERAL COURT
INTERVENTION IN CIVm ACTIONS
It seems clear that the rules involving federal intervention
in state civil proceedings do not fall within the purview of
Younger and its companion decisions. Thus, if a case can be
25 It is important to note that an allegation of "overbreath" is preferable
to one of "vagueness" when attempting to gain federal intervention.
The decision of Justice Brennan in Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241
(1967) illustrated that, in an overbreadth situation, there is no possi-
bility of the state court remedying the federal question; while, if the
claim was one of vagueness, the state court could resolve the issue.
Because of this, federal court abstention is less appropriate irk an over-
breadth situation, and intervention is more palatable for the state
courts.
26 401 U.S. 82 (1971).
27 Id. at 103.
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categorized as civil, it is legitimate to assume that Younger may
be successfully avoided. Obviously, this approach must be taken
in a federal suit attacking juvenile statutes and proceedings if
the bad faith requirement is to be avoided and the irreparable
injury requirement minimized.
In the same term as the Younger case, the Supreme Court
in Wisconsin v. Constantineau21 affirmed a three-judge court
decision which struck down a state statute requiring the posting
of the names of excessive drinkers and forbidding the sale of
liquor to them. The statute29 made no provision for a hearing
prior to such posting. Justice Douglas in delivering the majority
opinion (Justice Black and others dissented) considered whether
or not the three-judge court should have abstained from making
a decision and thereby allowed the state judicial machinery to
consider the constitutionality of the statute in question. The
Court said:
Congress could, of course, have routed all federal constitutional
questions through the state court systems, saving to this Court
the final say when it came to review of the state court judg-
ments. But our First Congress resolved differently and created
the federal court system and in time granted the federal courts
various heads of jurisdiction, which today involve most federal
constitutional rights. Once that jurisdiction was granted, the
federal courts resolved those questions even when they were
enmeshed with state law questions.
3 0
Clearly, the issues of federalism raised in the criminal context
of Younger were more liberally treated in the civil context of
Constantineau.
A. The Noncriminal Nature of Juvenile Proceedings
Whether juvenile proceedings are to be characterized as
criminal or civil creates an immediate dilemma. Many of the
major reforms accomplished in the juvenile field have been
attained by analogizing juvenile cases to the criminal process.
As pointed out in Gault, "[a] proceeding where the issue is
whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected
to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness
to a felony prosecution. '31 The Court slipped easily into the
criminal analogy, as evidenced by this statement: "The essential
difference between Gerald's case and a normal criminal case is
that safeguards available to adults were discarded in Gerald's
28400 U.S. 433 (1971).
2!) WIs. STAT. ANN. § 176.26 (1957).
30 400 U.S. at 438.
31 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
32 Id. at 29.
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case. 's 2 On the other hand, when speaking of the due process
notice requirement, the Court indicated that the petition must
inform the parties of the charges in a manner "which would be
deemed constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal pro-
ceeding."38
For the purpose of interjecting fifth amendment self-in-
crimination privileges into the juvenile court process the Court
stated:
[J]uvenile proceedings to determine "delinquency," which may
lead to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as
"criminal" for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. To hold otherwise would be to disregard substance be-
cause of the feeble enticement of the "civil" label-of-convenience
which has been attached to juvenile proceedings. Indeed, in over
half of the States, there is not even assurance that the juvenile
will be kept in separate institutions, apart from adult "crimi-
nals."3
4
A similar attitude is reflected in Justice Black's separate
concurrence in Gault. He pointed out that the goals of treat-
ment and rehabilitation had not been attained in the juvenile
court process, and, therefore, because incarceration in an insti-
tution penal in nature was possible, the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights should uniformly apply to juvenile proceedings. He
dismissed the civil label generally attached to juvenile pro-
ceedings stating:
[B]oth courts and legislators have shrunk back from labeling
these laws as "criminal" and have preferred to call them "civil."
This, in part, was to prevent the full application to juvenile
court cases of the Bill of Rights safeguards .... 35
Criticism of the use of the civil designation also appears in
Kent v. United States.36 Here, a cursory waiver of jurisdiction
over a child resulted in the transfer of the case to a district
court for an adult criminal trial. In reversing, the Supreme
Court questioned the civil status of the proceeding but did not
preclude that characterization. The majority stated:
The theory of the District's Juvenile Court Act, like that of
other jurisdictions, is rooted in social welfare philosophy rather
than in the corpus juris. Its proceedings are designated as civil
rather than criminal. The Juvenile Court is theoretically en-
gaged in determining the needs of the child and of society rather
than adjudicating criminal conduct.
3 7
3 3 Id. at 33.
34 Id. at 49-50.
35 Id. at 59.
36 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
37 Id. at 554. This case was the harbinger of Gault:
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose
of juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise
serious questions as to whether actual performance measures
well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the
immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional guar-
anties applicable to adults.
Id. at 555.
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Kent suggests that the failings of the juvenile court process
have been recognized and that a label will no longer insulate
the juvenile system from the Bill of Rights where these inade-
quacies have remained unremedied.
While Gault rejected the value of nomenclature such as
"civil" and "criminal," In re Winship"8 indicated that the label
of delinquency might also lack significance. In that case, the
appellant had been adjudicated a delinquent for violation of
New York's larceny statute. The standard of proof applied by
the juvenile court was a preponderence of the evidence rather
than beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that
due process requires the reasonable doubt standard to be applied
in delinquency cases. The reasoning was similar to Gault in
that emphasis was placed on the possibility of incarceration
after adjudication. The Court, however, did not take the absolu-
tist view that all adult criminal safeguards were required
in juvenile cases. Rather, as established in Gault, a pattern of
selection and adoption under the due process clause was con-
tinued. Justice Harlan squarely faced the selective application
question in his concurrence:
I wish to emphasize, as I did in my separate opinion in Gault
... that there is no automatic congruence between the proced-
ural requirements imposed by due process in a criminal case,
and those imposed by due process in juvenile cases. It is of great
importance, in my view, that procedural strictures not be consti-
tutionally imposed that jeopardize "the essential elements of the
State's purpose" in creating juvenile courts .... 39
Justice Harlan's admonition that the original purpose of
juvenile courts not be forgotten in the process of giving juve-
niles greater procedural safeguards is echoed loudly in Mc
Keiver v. Pennsylvania.40 This case represents a significant
shift away from Kent, Gault, and Winship where the emphasis
had been on procedural fairness and the assurance of fair treat-
ment through the application of procedural safeguards.
38 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Mr. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice
Stewart, dissented:
The Court's opinion today rests entirely on the assumption
that all juvenile proceedings are "criminal prosecutions," hence
subject to constitutional limitations. This derives from earlier
holdings, which, like today's holding, were steps eroding the
differences between juvenile courts and traditional criminal
courts.
I cannot regard it as a manifestation of progress to
transform juvenile courts into criminal courts .
Id. at 375-76. The Chief Justice's view became the majority view in
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
39 397 U.S. 374-75 (1970).
40403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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McKeiver eliminates the possibility of an absolutist view
prevailing in applying criminal safeguards to juvenile proceed-
ings. The opinion reflects the philosophy of earlier juvenile
reformers, such as Judge Julian Mack, 4" and reaffirms the tradi-
tional notion of the juvenile court as a surrogate father figure.
However, McKeiver can be strongly criticized for its failure to
suggest any remedy for the unfortunate child who is shuffled
through the juvenile process only to receive little of what was
41 Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. Rxv. 104 (1909). This article has
been widely quoted as a statement of the original philosophy of the
juvenile court system. An excerpt will amply demonstrate the thrust
of this view:
The child who must be brought into court should, of course,
be made to know that he is face to face with the power of the
state, but he should at the same time, and more emphatically,
be made to feel that he is the object of its care and solicitude.
The ordinary trappings of the court-room are out of place in
such hearings. The judge on a bench, looking down upon the
boy standing at the bar, can never evoke a proper sympathetic
spirit. Seated at a desk, with the child at his side, where he can
on occasion put his arm around his shoulder and draw the lad
to him, the judge, while losing none of his judicial dignity,
will gain immensely in the effectiveness of his work ....
Id. at 120. See also Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Per-
spective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970); Ketcham, The Unfulfilled
Promise of the Juvenile Court, 7 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 97 (1971).
Two patterns of change are presently operating in the field. One
is the major thrust of Kent, Gault and Winship providing adult criminal
safeguards in juvenile cases. See In re Robert T., 8 Cal. App. 3d 990, 88
Cal. Rptr. 37 (1970); In re Marsh, 40 Ill. 2d 53, 237 N.E.2d 529 (1968);
In re the Interest of B., 95 N.J. Super. 307, 230 A.2d 907 (1967); In re
R., 60 Misc. 2d 355, 303 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1969); Ciulla v.
State, 434 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) applying the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule to juvenile proceedings. The requirement to
hold probable cause hearings was discussed in Brown v. Fauntleroy,
442 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1971); and Cooley v. Stone, 414 F.2d 1213 (D.C.
Cir. 1969). Lineup requirements for juvenile proceedings were set out
in In re Spencer, 288 Minn. 119, 179 N.W.2d 95 (1970). On double
jeopardy, consider Collins v. State, 429 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968); and on free transcript for appeal see In re Karren, 280 Minn. 377,
159 N.W.2d 402 (1968).
On the other hand, there has been a significant effort to require
the court to provide treatment as prescribed by the underpinnings of
juvenile court philosophy. In support of a right to treatment, see Kent
v. United States, 401 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Creek v. Stone, 379
F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Haziel v. United States, 404 F.2d 1275 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); Lollis v. New York, 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); White
v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954); In re Vasko, 238 App. Div.
128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933); Smith v. State, 444 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1969); Bazelon, Forward, A Symposium-The Right to Treat-
ment, 57 GEO. L.J. 675 (1969); Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment
Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process, 57 GEO. L.J. 848 (1969); Note,
The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REv. 1134 (1967).
Do the attempts to provide treatment and incorporate criminal safe-
guards collide? There is no legal reason why one must exclude the
other. The hopes of Judge Mack, at least with respect to courtroom
decorum, have been dashed. However, procedural fairness as pointed
out by Justice Harlan in Winship need not interfere with the treatment
aspects of the procedure. Rather, it seems fairness in the courtroom
would aid whatever treatment came later. This may be so even though
Justice Fortas in Gault at footnote 30 indicated treatment might be a
quid pro quo for the lack of procedural safeguards.
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promised. The "worst of both worlds" philosophy is reinforced
and given renewed vitality in McKeiver.42
The selective approach to the application of constitutional
safeguards taken by McKeiver is based upon a laissez-faire con-
cept of the federal judiciary; i.e., the states should be free to
experiment in order to achieve high goals in the juvenile court
process. Consequently, the requirement of jury trials was felt
to impede this self-correcting process by compelling the use of a
full adversary procedure and thereby defeating what the Court
described as an "intimate, informal protective proceeding.
'4
This view was adopted even though the Court recognized that
the history of the juvenile court is replete with failure.
On the other hand, for all of its shortcomings, McKeiver
does support the proposition that Younger should not apply to
juvenile court proceedings because they are essentially non-
criminal in nature. As stated by the Court:
[T]he juvenile court proceeding has not yet been held to be a
"criminal prosecution," within the meaning and reach of the
Sixth Amendment, and also has not yet been regarded as devoid
of criminal aspects merely because it usually has been given
the civil label.
44
In addition to case law, some juvenile jurisdictional statutes
clearly indicate the unique nature of the juvenile institution. A
typical example of such a statute found in every state is the
CHINS, PINS or wayward child provision.45 Dealing only with
42403 U.S. 528 (1971).
There is much evidence that some juvenile courts, including
that of the District of Columbia, lack the personnel, facilities,
and techniques to perform adequately as representatives of the
State in a parens patriae capacity, at least with respect to chil-
dren charged with law violation. There is evidence, in fact,
that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives
the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protection
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children.
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966).
While McKeiver states a declaration of delinquency is significantly
different from a criminal conviction, it is interesting to note the pro-
visions of the Proposed RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR COURTS, Vol. 91, No. 12
S. Ct. Rptr. Advanced Sheets in the same regard. Rule 609(d) states
evidence of a juvenile adjudication is generally not admissible under
this rule. The judge may, however, allow evidence of juvenile adjudi-
cation of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense
would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the judge
is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determina-
tion of the issue of guilt or innocence.
It will be interesting to see whether or not this version of the rule
remains in the draft finally adopted by the Supreme Court.
43 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
44 Id. at 541.
45 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-2 (Supp. 1967).
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children who are "beyond control" or are in danger of "leading
an immoral life," such statutes do not effect the adult criminal
law enforcement scheme. No particular act is proscribed by
such statutes; rather, the crime is one of status which, if ap-
plied to adults, would be impermissible.46 Additionally, most
state statutes declare that the proceedings in juvenile court are
"civil."47
The scope and purpose of juvenile statutes indicate a far
different objective from that evidenced in criminal statutes. The
aim of the latter is to protect society by stigmatizing certain
conduct, while the goal of the former is to enhance and improve
the well-being of the child, the benefit to society being only
consequential. Therefore, the concern shown in the Younger
series to the potential disruption of the state's scheme of crimi-
nal law enforcement is arguably inapplicable to juvenile pro-
eedings because the ramifications are not the same. Thus, it is
not unreasonable to conclude that challenges to juvenile statutes
can escape the procedural limitations imposed by Younger since
such statutes deal with the status of a child rather than criminal
conduct per se.
B. The Existence of Irreparable Injury
Regardless of whether the proceeding is criminal or civil
in nature, irreparable injury prevails as a threshold requirement
before an injunctive remedy can be granted. In Younger, the
Court indicated that the standard for irreparable injury in crim-
inal proceedings must be greater than the normal injury inci-
dental to a single state criminal prosecution, even though the
state prosecution includes the threat of imprisonment and the
expense of a defense. However, in a civil proceeding the standard
is clearly less stringent. In Wisconsin v. Constantineau48 the in-
jury consisted of the infamy and embarrassment of having one's
name posted publicly as an excessive drinker. The Court held
that this injury presented a sufficient federal question and,
therefore, federal court intervention was deemed proper. It
would seem appropriate that cases involving injunctions in ju-
venile proceedings should be judged by a similar standard.
49
46 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962).
47 See, e.g., CoLo. R. Juv. P. 1 (1970); CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-7,
22-1-12 (Supp. 1969).
48 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
41 Note, however, the limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970) concerning
staying pending state court proceedings.
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In the typical juvenile case the injury that can be incurred
through subjection to the juvenile processes can be extremely
grave. Institutionalization itself may be sufficient irreparable
injury to justify federal intervention. Rehabilitation and treat-
ment are the goals sought; however, the juvenile institutional
system has many critics who believe it fails to achieve those
goals on a grand scale.50 Thus, in Gault the Court noted:
A boy is committed to an institution where he may be restrained
of liberty for years. It is of no constitutional consequence -and
of limited practical meaning - that the institution to which he
is committed is called an Industrial School. The fact of the mat-
ter is that, however euphemistic the title, a "receiving home"
or an "industrial school" for juveniles is an institution of con-
finement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or
lesser time. His world becomes "a building with whitewashed
walls, regimented routine and institutional hours .... Instead of a
mother and father and sisters and brothers and friends and
classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state
employees, and "delinquents" confined with him for anything
from "waywardness" to rape and homicide. 5'
Generally, no bail is granted or allowed in juvenile cases
pending appeal,5 2 and some states do not even provide a direct
appeal system.5 3 Thus, the child suffers incarceration while an
appeal or collateral attack is pending. As a result, before an
appeal can be heard, the child will often have completed the
term of incarceration prescribed by the court. Therefore, it
would appear that the lack of bail pending appeal and the con-
ditions of incarceration would be sufficient to show irreparable
injury in a juvenile context.
Even temporary incarceration has been condemned as seri-
ously injurious to a child.54 If the system of incarceration is
demonstrably punitive, the injury to a child is far more serious
than the incidental injury to an adult in a normal criminal
prosecution. The association with institutional personnel and
other more sophisticated delinquents has been criticized as
causing the child to identify himself as a delinquent and "no
5 0 
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH
CRIME 7-9 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
51 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).
52 Colorado appears unique in this aspect. Bail, and perhaps bail pending
appeal, is provided for in COLO. R. Juv. P. 59(c) (1970).
;, 387 U.S. 1, 58 (1967). This situaticn, however, makes the avenue of
federal habeas corpus more attractive since the exhaustion of state
remedies has been accomplished. See Comment, Appellate Review of
Juvenile Court Proceedings and the Role of the Attorney, 13 ST. L.U.L.J.
90 (1968).




good." 55 It would seem that such danger to the child, given the
unfulfilled promise of homelike surroundings in such institu-
tions, would support a finding of immediate and irreparable
injury.56
CONCLUSION
Younger v. Harris and its companions create problems in
seeking federal injunctive and declaratory relief in pending
juvenile proceedings. The problems appear, however, to be
surmountable by careful pleading according to the scope of the
cases noted in this article. The ultimate question of whether
or not juvenile proceedings are criminal, for federal injunctive
purposes, must be resolved. By analyzing the recent juvenile
cases considered by the Supreme Court, it does appear that these
proceedings are to remain classified as civil. Upon this premise,
most of the inhibiting factors found in Younger may be dis-
missed as inapplicable to federal actions challenging juvenile
statutes and practices. Hopefully, however, juveniles will not
receive the "worst of both worlds" in the resolution of this
issue.
Where desirable, the federal courts offer an excellent forum
for the redress of constitutional grievances occurring in juvenile
court. Although the pitfalls of lack of federal jurisdiction are
plentiful, they may generally be successfully avoided. With due
consideration of those problems, federal courts can provide a
workable avenue for sophisticated juvenile law reform.
5a In re William M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 473 P.2d 737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970). In
the TASK FORCE REPORT it is stated:
Detention facilities for youngsters in many communities do
little to include law-abiding behavior on their part and in many
instances may actually contribute to later violations of the law.
The National Survey found that an estimated 100,000 juveniles
are detained in jails and similar facilities for adults in the
United States each year. Only three jurisdictions -Connecti-
cut, Puerto Rico and Vermont - can actually claim that their
jails are never used for children, though many States have laws
forbidding such practices.
The failure of a juvenile court to advise children of their right to coun-
-el was considered irreparable injury in Phillips v. Cole, 298 F. Supp.
1049 (N.D. Miss. 1968).
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